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1. THE QUESTION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITY RIGHTS  
IN EUROPE
The number of decisions upholding legislative measures restricting 
the right to wear religious symbols is mushrooming in Europe. In 2017, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union  ruled on the case of Achbi-
ta v. G4S Secure Solutions.1 It held that the internal rule of a private 
company prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophi-
cal or religious sign in the workplace, specifically the Islamic heads-
carf, did not constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief 
according to EU antidiscrimination law.2 It was found, however, that 
it could constitute a form of indirect discrimination, which may only 
be objectively justified by the legitimate aim of the neutrality of the 
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Politics, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Hermann-
Föge-Weg 11, 37073 Göttingen (Germany), e-mail: tania.pagotto@unive.it
1 Samira Achbita, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding 
v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, No. C-157/15 (EUCJ, 2017); Asma Bougnaoui, Association 
de défense des droits de l’homme (ADDH) v. Micropole SA, No. C-188/15 (EUCJ, 2017).
2 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000. 
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business, provided that the means of achieving that aim are appropriate 
and necessary.3 On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has reverted to the question of religious symbols covering the 
face in public spaces (burqa and niqab), adjudicating two cases involv-
ing the Belgian ban: it upheld the national legislative measures, appeal-
ing for the second time in its jurisprudence to the contested argument 
of “living together.”4 
This article focuses on the latter issue. It starts by recounting the 
history of the drafting process of legislation banning the full-face veil 
in Belgium and France and the pivotal notion of “living together” 
[Section 2]. Secondly, it summarizes the facts of the three relevant cases 
adjudicated by the Court of Strasbourg: SAS v. France (2014), Belca-
cemi and Oussar v. Belgium, and Dakir v. Belgium (2017) [Section 3]. 
Afterwards, the paper recalls the general principles protecting religious 
freedom under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
[Section 4]. Thus, it explains the decisions of these cases paying atten-
tion to the way the Court used “living together” as a legal justifica-
tion for the prohibition of the full-face veil [Section 5]. Finally, on the 
basis of the aforementioned material, it argues two points: 1. the ECtHR 
did not offer in its decisions a robust legal analysis to legitimize this 
new argument and these cases represent a culmination of the tenden-
cy towards legal decisions based on abstract ideas [Section 6]; 2. an 
engaged Court should adopt a more fact-oriented approach, in view of 
the fact that the proportionality principle is expressly incorporated in 
the Convention [Section 7]. 
3 Eva Brems et al., “Head-Covering Bans in Belgian Courtrooms and Beyond: Headscarf 
Persecution and the Complicity of Supranational Courts,” Human Rights Quarterly 39, no. 
4 (2017): 882-909; Lucy Vickers, “Achbita and Bougnaoui: One Step Forward and Two 
Steps Back for Religious Diversity in the Workplace,” European Labour Law Journal 8, no. 
3 (2017): 232–57.
4 SAS v. France, No. 43835/11 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber 2014); Belcacemi and Oussar 
v. Belgium, No. 37798/13 (ECtHR 2017); Dakir v. Belgium, No. 4619/12 (ECtHR 2017).
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2. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING THE NOTION OF “LIVING TOGETHER”: 
 ITS ESSENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS 
In this Section, the article describes the drafting process of the legis-
lation banning the full-face veil in Belgium and France and briefly 
outlines the constitutional background surrounding it as well as the way 
the “living together” argument has emerged. Afterwards, it offers an 
analysis of its features and meaning.   
2.1. THE LEGAL DISCUSSION: THE DRAFTING PROCESS OF THE LAWS  
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
The topic of the full-face veil ban has been subject to a particularly 
high level of attention from commentators and constitutional lawyers. 
On the one hand, this issue relates to some of the fundamental pillars of 
the Belgian and French legal orders and raises questions on the compat-
ibility of the full-face veil with the principles of laïcité, fraternity and 
dignity of women.5 On the other hand, there is discordance between 
the apparently neutral nature of the bans, which forbid the conceal-
ment of the face in public, and the people’s specific preoccupation with 
the Islamic veil shown by the travaux preparatoires, which provide a 
record of the discussion that took place during the drafting of the legis-
lation.6 This calls into question some doubts relating to the supposedly 
neutral nature of the ban and merits an enquiry into the possibility that 
it is discriminative on religious grounds.7
5 Constantin Languille, La Possibilité du Cosmopolitisme. Burqa, Droits de l’homme et 
Vivre-Ensemble (Paris: Gallimard, 2015), 9.
6 Eva Brems, Jogchum Vrielink, and Saïla Ouald Chaib, “Uncovering French and 
Belgian Face Covering Bans,” Journal of Law, Religion and State 2, no. 1 (2013): 74.
7 Myriam Hunter-Henin, “Why the French Don’t Like the Burqa: Laïcité, National 
Identity and Religious Freedom,” International & Comparative Law Quarterly 61, no. 03 
(July 2012): 613-639.
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2.1.1 BELGIUM 
In Belgium, the drafting process of the full-face ban has been one 
of the flagship policies of the right-wing Vlaams Blok party.8 The first 
proposal dates back to 2004 and other attempts occurred between 2007 
and 2010.9 Soon after the 2010 elections, the bill was approved by an 
overwhelming majority10 and was subject to an extremely fast legisla-
tive process, involving only one of the two parliamentary Chambers.11 
Questions concerning human rights and individual fundamental 
freedoms were not addressed in depth – it has been noted that the debate 
carried out amounted to no more than a “pure formality done out of 
respect for the required democratic debate.”12
2.1.2 FRANCE 
The French reflection on the meaning of the vivre ensemble concept, 
and more generally the ideal of République à visage découvert, repre-
sented, as expressed by Constantin Languille, an “ideal scene where 
all the arguments relating to the place of Islam in French society were 
expressed and opposed against each other.”13 In France, as in Belgium, 
the proposal for a ban was first put forward by a right-wing party;14 
though here it did go through a more sophisticated drafting process, 
involving experts, ad hoc commissions and decisions delivered by the 
8 Eva Brems, Saila Ouald-Chaib, and Jogchum Vrielink, “The Belgian «Burqa Ban»: 
Legal Aspects of Local and General Prohibitions on Covering and Concealing One’s Face 
in Belgium,” in The Burqa Affair across Europe: Between Public and Private Space, eds. 
Alessandro Ferrari and Sabrina Pastorelli (Farnham, Surrey: Routledge, 2016), 157. 
9 Ibid. 
10 129 ayes, 1 nay and 2 abstentions. Ghent University Human Rights Centre, “Written 
Submission by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University in the Case of SAS v. France,” 
2014, 4, http://www.hrc.ugent.be.
11 The Chambre des Représentants and the Sénat. Ibid. 
12 Xavier Delgrange, “La loi «anti-burqa» comme symptôme,” Politique - Revue de 
débats, no. 74 (2012), 42-50. Translation mine.  
13 Languille, La Possibilité Du Cosmopolitisme. Burqa, Droits de l’homme et Vivre-En-
semble, 8.
14 Jacques Myard an MP for the Centre-Right UMP. See Proposition de loi visant à lutter 
contre les atteintes à la dignité de la femme résultant de certaines pratiques religieuses, 
Parliamentary documents no. 3056, 4 October 2006. 
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highest judicial institutions.15 In 2010, the report of the Gerìn Commis-
sion was published,16 stating that the full veil infringed three constitutive 
principles of the French Republic – liberty, equality and brotherhood, 
since it represented a rejection of the common will to live together.17 
Shortly after, the Council of State expressed an opinion that a general 
ban had no certain legal basis and the idea of “living together” had no 
solid doctrinal background. Despite this, in 2010 the general ban was 
enacted by a great majority,18 and was followed by a decision of the 
Conseil Constitutionnel,19 acknowledging its constitutionality.20
 2.2. FIRST MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF “LIVING TOGETHER”:  
  A PRE-CONDITION FOR COMMUNICATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS
In both Belgian and French social, legal and political scenarios, the 
idea of “living together” comprises two aspects: one relates to commu-
nication, the other relates to the need to build a mutual trust necessary 
for the enjoyment of rights and liberties by all the members of society. 
The first meaning of “living together” deals with the proposed 
benefits of people being able to communicate face to face, which is 
argued to be an essential aspect of verbal and non-verbal exchanges.21 
As far as this argument is related to the wearing of the Islamic veil, this 
15 Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, “Written Submission by the Human Rights 
Centre of Ghent University in the Case of Dakir v. Belgium,” 2016, 2-3, http://www.hrc.
ugent.be. 
16 A. Gérin, “Rapport d’information fait en application de l’article 145 du règlement 
au nom de la mission d’information sur la pratique du port du voile intégral sur le territoire 
national,” 26 January 2010, www.assemblee-nationale.fr, in particular pages, 71 ff. 
17 Ibid. 
18 335 ayes, only 1 nay, and 221 abstentions and, in the Senate 246 ayes, 1 nay, and 100 
abstentions: Eva Brems, ed., The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7.
19 Conseil Constitutionnel, 7 October 2010, no. 2010-613613 DC. 
20 The Conseil Constitutionnel made only minor reservations on places of worship, 
which had not to be covered by the ban. Ibid., at para. 5. 
21 Armin Steinbach, “Burqas and Bans: The Wearing of Religious Symbols under the 
European Convention of Human Rights,” Cambridge Journal of International and Compar-
ative Law 4 (2015): 46.
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argument is not exclusive to the French and Belgian contexts, but it has 
been addressed and explored also by judges of different jurisdictions, 
such as in England and the Netherlands.22
While the argument of interaction in society and the need to estab-
lish a proper environment for the best communication of individuals 
has been deployed particularly in the educational context, the second 
aspect of the “living together” concept has a wider significance and has 
been developed in relation to society as a whole. 
2.3. THE SECOND MEANING OF “LIVING TOGETHER”:  
A PRE-CONDITION TO ENTER SOCIETY 
The second meaning of vivre ensemble originated in the writing on 
human sociology by the French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas 
(1906–1995).23 Afterwards, it inspired the Belgian Guy Haarscher 
(1946), who applied it specifically to the wearing of the full-face veil.24 
In their view, the ability to see people’s faces prevents the creation of a 
disruptive asymmetry between those who show themselves and those 
who do not. Most of all, the rapport de face à face is a minimal precon-
dition for building mutual trust, for a peaceful cohabitation in society 
and is an essential ingredient of ethical behaviour.25 This idea was also 
cited during the French and Belgian political debate as a rationale in 
support of what is known as the burqa ban. 
22 Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, No. UKEAT 0009/07/3003 (Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal 2007); R (on the application of X) v. Headteachers of Y School and 
another (Queen’s Bench 2007); Commissie Gelijke Behandeling (Netherlands Commission 
for Gender Equality), Judgment no. 40 of 2003). See Anastasia Vakulenko, Islamic Veiling 
in Legal Discourse (New York: Routledge, 2012), 39.
23 Bettina Bergo, “Emmanuel Levinas,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
Edward N. Zalta, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu. 
24 Hugues Dumont and Xavier Delgrange, “Le Principe de Pluralisme Face à la Question 
du Voile Islamique en Belgique,” Droit et société, no. 68 (2008): 75-108. See also Guy 
Haarscher, “Secularism, the Veil and Reasonable Interlocutors: Why France Is Not That 
Wrong,” Penn State International Law Review 28, no. 3 (2010-2009): 367-82.
25 François-Xavier Millet, “When the European Court of Human Rights Encounters the 
Face,” European Constitutional Law Review 11, no. 02 (2015): 408-424.
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Indeed, the French drafters of the 2010 law considered that the 
regular wearing of the veil corresponds to a systematic betrayal of the 
fundamental values of democracy and a threat to national cohesion.26 
Also in Belgium, the legislature primarily pursued the creation of a 
proper space for social interaction between individuals, relying on the 
idea of reconnaître pour connaître.27 For example, the 2011 Report 
to Chambre Des Représentants de Belgique states that wearing the 
full-face veil constitutes a contravention of fundamental princi-
ples of civilisation and represents a systematic rejection of human 
interaction.28 
3. THE FACTS OF THE THREE CASES INVOLVING THE “LIVING TOGETHER” 
ARGUMENT: SAS, BELCACEMI AND OUSSAR, AND DAKIR
Although designed in neutral terms, as a matter of fact, the burqa 
and niqab bans impact primarily Muslim women who may have decid-
ed, independently, voluntarily and free from any pressure, to wear a 
full-face veil for religious reasons.29 It is not by chance that the cases 
involving the “living together” concept stemmed from situations relat-
ed to practising Muslim women. The following section summarizes the 
relevant facts of Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, Dakir v. Belgium 
and SAS v. France. 
26 Hana van Ooijen, Religious Symbols in Public Functions: Unveiling State Neutrality, 
School of Human Rights Research Series (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012). 
27 Poposition de Loi, Doc 52 2289/001, 1 December 2009, http://www.lachambre.be; 
Proposition de Loi, Doc 53 0219/004, http://www.dekamer.be. 
28  Ibid. 
29 For example, the French law, on the one hand, sanctions with a fine and/or a course of 
citizenship education (Art. 3) those who violate the law concealing their face; in addition, it 
punishes with one year of imprisonment and a large fine, anyone who forces another person, 
in various way, to cover the face (Art. 4). The Belgian law establishes a penalty of 15 until 
25 euros and 1 to 7 days of imprisonment those who appear in public with their face covered 
or unrecognizable (Art. 2) but, notably, makes no provision for those ones forcing other to 
wear the veil.  
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3.1. THE FRENCH CASE: SAS (2014) 
The case of SAS30 involved a French devout Muslim girl of Pakistani 
origin, who claimed that the 2010 French ban on the concealment of the 
face in public spaces31 constituted a violation of some of her fundamen-
tal freedoms under the European Convention. The applicant emphasised 
that neither her husband nor any member of her family put pressure on 
her to dress in such a way. Sometimes she wore the burqa or the niqab 
“not to annoy others but to feel at inner peace with herself.”32 After 
the French ban had come into force, she filed an application before the 
ECtHR claiming that it was a violation of her rights to private life (Art. 
8) and to freedom of religion (Art. 9) separately and in conjunction with 
Art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination).33
 3.2. THE BELGIAN CASES: BELCACEMI AND OUSSAR AND DAKIR (2017)    
Ms Belcacemi and Ms Oussar had an experience similar to that 
of the applicant of SAS: they were two Muslim women accustomed 
to wearing the niqab in public spaces, on their own initiative and for 
religious reasons. When the Law of 1 June 2011 was enacted,34 Ms 
Belcacemi decided at first to continue to wear the niqab; subsequently, 
feeling under pressure, she decided to avoid doing so.35 She declared 
that she had no other choice due to her fear of facing public, social 
stigma. Differently from the first applicant, Ms Oussar decided to stay 
at home, with the resulting restriction of her social interaction, private 
and community life.36 
30 SAS v. France, No. 43835/11 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber 2014). 
31 Law 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010, JORF n°0237 du 12 octobre 2010 page 18344 
texte n° 1 (France). 
32 SAS v. France, para. 12.
33 The claimant complained also under Art. 3, 11 and 10 but the Court declared the 
application respectively inadmissible (paras. 69-71), manifestly ill-founded (paras. 72-73) 
and stated that no issue arises under Article 10 (para. 163).  
34 Law of 1 June 2011, Moniteur Belge F. 2011—1778 C-2011/00424 (Belgium). 
35 See para. 9 of the judgment. 
36 See para. 10 of the judgment. 
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In the second case, Ms Dakir did not challenge the 2011 law, rather 
a by-law with a similar content, adopted in 2008 by three municipalities 
prior to the national ban.37 She had been wearing the full-face veil since 
the age of 16, a decision accepted by her husband and her family. She 
applied to the Conseil d’État38 for the annulment of the ban39 but her 
application was dismissed for the failure to satisfy a strict admissibility 
requirement. 
The women filed an application before the Court of Strasbourg, 
claiming a violation of many of the Convention’s rights: among the 
others, Art. 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Art. 9 
(freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Art. 10 (freedom of 
expression), separately and in conjunction with Art. 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination).40 
4. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM UNDER THE ECHR SYSTEM:  
ART. 9 OF THE CONVENTION, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY  
AND THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION   
Before analysing the decisions, it is important to describe briefly how 
the Convention’s system guarantees religious freedom in Art. 9 ECHR 
(freedom of thought, conscience and religion).41 The first paragraph 
protects the absolute aspect of the rights enshrined in the provision and 
requires the State to respect the inner sphere of an individual.42 The 
second paragraph of Art. 9 protects the qualified rights relating to the 
37 The cities of Pepinster, Dison, Verviers: para. 9 of the judgment.
38 Conseil d’État, No. 213.849, A. 189.481/XI-16.517, du 15 juin 2011. 
39 In particular she impugned Art. 113ter of the relevant by-law (para. 10 of the 
judgement).
40 Ms Belcacemi and Oussar complained also a breach of Art. 3 (prohibition of inhuman 
or degrading treatment), Art. 11 (freedom of assembly and association), Art. 2, Prot. 4 
(freedom of movement); Ms Dakir claimed in addition a violation of Art. 6, para. 1 (right of 
access to a court) and Art. 13 (right to an effective remedy).   
41 Carolyn M. Evans, Freedom of Religion Under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
42 Nicolas Bratza, “The «Precious Asset»: Freedom of Religion Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 14, no. 2 (2012): 256-71.
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forum externum, which involves the manifestation of a religion or a 
belief. The Convention specifies the circumstances in which worship, 
teaching, practice and observance may be limited by national authori-
ties.43 To be legitimate, the restriction must be prescribed by law and be 
necessary in a democratic society; the limitation must be proportionate 
to its aim, namely public safety and order, protection of health, morals 
or the rights and freedoms of others.44 The Court scrutinizes a potential-
ly impinging measure and checks its compliance with the Convention 
against these criteria. This is the essence of the proportionality test.45 
In addition to that, other instruments assist the Court and play an 
important role in the conventionality control. With particular regard to 
Art. 9, the fact that generally the relations between a state and religious 
groups are to a great extent shaped by national history and traditions,46 
led the Court of Strasbourg to elaborate and use the concept of the margin 
of appreciation, in relation to religious matters.47 The Court grants the 
Member States of the Council of Europe some room to manoeuvre 
and combine in various ways both the Convention’s standards and the 
national experiences.48
The margin of appreciation is neither pre-determined nor without any 
limits.49 Indeed its breadth is dependent on a number of factors, above 
all the presence of a consensus on a given subject among the Contract-
43 Peter W. Edge, Legal Responses to Religious Difference (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2002), 39-60.
44 Samantha Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 49-53. 
45 George Letsas, “Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation,” Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 26, no. 4 (21 December 2006): 705-32.
46 See, for an overview: Norman Doe, Law and Religion in Europe: A Comparative 
Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
47 Eyal Benvenisti, “Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards,” 
International Law and Politics 31, no. 4 (1998): 843-54.
48 Cfr. Protocol No. 15 Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.
49 Steven Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion under the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2000); Dean Spiel-
mann, “Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human  Rights and the National 
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?,” 2013, 
http://www.echr.coe.int.
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ing Parties of the Convention. When the States of the Council of Europe 
regulate a certain matter in a similar fashion, the Court acknowledges 
the existence of a consensus and narrows down the margin of appre-
ciation left to the respondent Government. When the practice of the 
European legal orders is different and there is no shared opinion, the 
Court recognizes the absence of the consensus on the matter at stake 
and exercises a degree of judicial restraint, granting a wider margin.  
5. THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF STRASBOURG
5.1.THE SAS CASE AND THE FIRST APPEARANCE OF THE “LIVING TOGETHER”  
CONCEPT
In the 2014 French case, the Grand Chamber recognized the 
existence of an interference with the applicant’s rights but rejected the 
applicant’s complaints. However, the Court did positively50 reject three 
of the four arguments advanced by the French Government to justify the 
ban: public safety,51 respect for women’s dignity,52 and gender equali-
50 As noted by Lucy Vickers, in rejecting these three rationales justifying the ban, the 
Court took some steps towards a positive evolution of its jurisprudence on the veil debate. 
In particular, it correctly specified that limiting the right to manifest one’s religion based on 
the public safety ground requires a concrete basis. Lucy Vickers, “Conform or Be Confined: 
S.A.S. v. France,” OxHRH Blog, 2014, www.ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk.
51 A general ban “can be regarded as proportionate only in a context where there is a 
general threat to public safety.” SAS v. France, para. 139. See also Eva Brems, “Face Veil 
Bans in the European Court of Human Rights: The Importance of Empirical Findings,” 
Journal of Law and Policy 22 (2013): 542-43. See also Vojnity v. Hungary, No. 29617/07 
(ECtHR 2013). Cfr. Ahmet Arslan et al. v. Turquie, No. 41135/98 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber 
2010).
52 The Court took the view that although respect for human dignity is paramount, it 
cannot justify an unlimited blanket ban. At para. 120; Teresa Sanader, “Religious Symbols 
and Garments in Public Places – A Theory for the Understanding of S.A.S. v. France,” Vienna 
Journal on International Constitutional Law / ICL Journal 9 (2015): 37. See also Stephanie 
Berry, “SAS v. France: Does Anything Remain of the Right to Manifest Religion?,” EJIL: 
Talk!, 2 July 2014, http://www.ejiltalk.org. 
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ty.53 At the same time, the Court justified the French ban by appealing 
to the “living together” concept, formulated at paragraph 121 of the 
decision.54
The face plays an important role in social interaction. It (The Court) 
can understand the view that individuals who are present in places 
open to all, may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing 
there which would fundamentally call into question the possibility 
of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an estab-
lished consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life 
within the society in question. The Court is therefore able to accept 
that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is 
perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to 
live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier.55
The case of SAS raised the concerns of the legal doctrine for the risk of 
impairing the soul of the Convention.56 Two dissenting judges sharply 
questioned the concept of “living together” as “far-fetched and vague”57 
and the separate opinions delivered in the Belgian cases echoed the 
same criticism.58 
53 The Court rejected the Government’s argument stressing that “a State Party cannot 
invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women”. At para. 
119. June Edmunds, “The Limits of Post-National Citizenship: European Muslims, Human 
Rights and the Hijab,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no. 7 (July 2012): 1192. Zachary R. 
Calo, “Islamic Headscarves, Religious Pluralism, and Secular Human Rights,” International 
Consortium for Law and Religion Studies Conference, Santiago, Chile, September 2011 
(SSRN, 28 August 2011): 2, http://ssrn.com.
54 This argument is not expressly mentioned by the Convention as permissible ground 
for limiting fundamental freedoms but was accepted by the Court as a legitimate aim, falling 
within the need to protect rights and freedom of others. It was mentioned in some documents 
published by the Council of Europe but has never been engaged by the Court to justify a 
restriction upon fundamental rights before SAS. See Yasha Lange, Living Together (Stras-
bourg: Council of Europe, 2009). 
55 At para. 121. Italics added. 
56 SAS has been considered one of the worst rulings of 2014: see the poll by the Stras-
bourg Observers blog at https://strasbourgobservers.com. 
57 See the joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in the case 
of SAS. 
58 See the separate opinion of judges Spano and Karakaş in Dakir. 
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5.2. THE BELGIAN CASES OF BELCACEMI AND OUSSAR,  
 AND DAKIR: THE ENDORSEMENT OF SAS   
In the 2017 judgements, the Court recalled and applied the principle 
established in SAS since the Belgian ban was expressed in legal terms 
similar to the French 2011 prohibition.59 
The ECtHR confirmed the absence of a clear consensus at a Europe-
an level and allowed a wide margin of discretion to the respondent State 
as to the necessity of a restriction on the right to manifest a religion 
or a belief.60 In both cases, ultimately, it stated that there had been no 
violation of Art. 9 and 8, the threshold of the minimal level of serious-
ness of ill-treatment had not been met in application of Art. 3, and the 
complaints under other provisions had been declared as manifestly 
ill-founded. The Court did find a violation of Art. 6, para. 1, in Dakir; 
however, this added nothing new to the debate on religious freedom.61
These judgements confirmed that the Court accepts vivre ensemble 
as one of the legitimate aims relevant for Art. 9, para. 2: the follow-
ing Section describes the notion of “living together” and afterwards the 
main issues related to its incorporation into the Convention’s system. 
6. FIRST OBSERVATION: A TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTRACT IDEAS.  
FROM BEHAVIOURS THROUGH SYMBOLS TO MODELS OF INTEGRATION  
What seems the most problematic point of the French and Belgian 
decisions is that the Court accepted the “living together” rationale, 
while adopting a highly abstract justification and assuing a deferential 
attitude towards the member States. This Section argues that the ECtHR 
demonstrated a capacity to evaluate concrete circumstances and stick to 
59 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium para. 49 and 53ff; Dakir v. Belgium para. 51 and 
55ff. 
60 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium para. 51; Dakir v. Belgium para. 54.
61 Frank Cranmer, “Strasbourg Upholds Belgian Niqab Ban: Belcacemi and Dakir,” Law 
& Religion UK, http://www.lawandreligionuk.com.
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the facts in some of its early decisions, in contrast to the current devel-
opment of its jurisprudence on the Islamic veil. 
On the one hand, the full-face veil has been defined as one of the 
“dilemma cases” discussed in the Strasbourg’s courtrooms in recent 
years62 and the great caution of the Court may be partly understandable. 
However, the Convention does not mention the idea of the minimal 
requirements of life in a society, nor does it make express reference to 
face-to-face communication. Moreover, the “breath-taking”63 width of 
the margin of appreciation allowed by the Court in its interpretation 
of Convention compliance leads us to further reflections involving the 
abstract nature of the motivation given in the judgments. 
6.1. THE COURT HAS THE CAPACITY TO STICK TO THE FACTS:  
 RE-READING EARLY DECISIONS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RELATING  
 TO BEHAVIORS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
It has been suggested that in the most recent case-law related to the 
Islamic headscarf,64 the Court makes assumptions about female religious 
practices without proper investigation of the nature of women’s prefer-
ences.65 Contrary to this trend, reading two earlier cases, related to the 
area of the forum internum and proselytism,66 reveals that the Court 
is actually equipped with the sophisticated capacity to combine the 
abstract nature of the law with nuanced factual considerations.67
62 Gerards Janneke, “Procedural Review by the ECtHR: A Typology,” in Procedural 
Review in European Fundamental Rights Cases, eds. Eva Brems and Gerards Janneke 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 147.
63 Mark Movsesian, “European Human Rights Court to France: Do Whatever You 
Want,” CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGION FORUM, 3 July 2014, https://clrforum.org.
64 See the case-law quoted at fn. 74-80. 
65 Jill Marshall, “S.A.S. v. France: Burqa Bans and the Control or Empowerment of 
Identities,” Human Rights Law Review 15, no. 2 (6 January 2015): 377-89.
66 Paul Bickley, The Problem of Proselytism (Theos, 2015), http://www.theosthinktank.
co.uk.
67 Jim Murdoch, Protecting the Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion 
under the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2012), 
46-49, http://www.coe.int.
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6.1.1 KOKKINAKIS V. GREECE (1993)
For example, in its first case on religious freedom, the matter of 
proselytism was brought to Strasbourg: in Kokkinakis v. Greece,68 
the Court balanced the right to freedom of religion of Mr Kokkina-
kis, a Jehovah’s witness convicted of proselytism, against the need to 
safeguard the rights and liberties of the proselytized.69 What is remark-
able is the attempt to mark the difference between ordinary degrees 
of psychological influence among people (“proper proselytism”) and 
dangerous and immoral behaviours (“improper proselytism”).70 This 
required isolating and giving prominence to certain human actions at 
the risk of being coercive. Thus, the Court drew a line between what is 
legal and what is not, putting an “inevitable ingredient of its interpreta-
tive practice” in the arena of the legal reasoning.71 
6.1.2 LARISSIS V. GREECE (1998)
In a subsequent decision, the ECtHR returned to the issue of evange-
lization. In Larissis v. Greece,72 it reflected on the psychological pressure 
exercised by the applicants, three senior officers of the Greek air force, 
convicted of proselytising airmen and civilians. Here the Court empha-
sised that the army may actually alter the perception of a conversation 
and switch it from “an innocuous exchange of ideas” to “a form of 
harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of power.”73
68 Kokkinakis v. Greece, No. 14307/88 (ECtHR 1993).
69 See Section 2 of the Greek law, no. 1672/1939.  
70 Kokkinakis v. Greece at para. 48. In particular, it defined the improper proselytism as 
the use of improper pressure on people in distress or in need, entailing the use of violence or 
brainwashing. See T. Jeremy Gunn, “Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the Europe-
an Convention on Human Rights,” in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal 
Perspectives, eds. John Witte Jr and Johan D. van der Vyver, vol. 2 (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
Inernational, 1996), 305-30. 
71 Mark Hill and Katherine Barnes, “Limitations on Freedom of Religion and Belief in 
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in the Quarter Century since Its 
Judgment in Kokkinakis v. Greece,” Religion & Human Rights 12, no. 2-3 (7 October 2017): 
174-97.
72 Larissis et al. v. Greece, No. 140/1996/759/958–960 (ECtHR 1998).
73 Ibid., 50-51.
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 6.2 ON RELIGIOUS GARMENTS, THE COURT TOOK A MORE ABSTRACT  
APPROACH: THE ISLAMIC VEIL
6.2.1 DAHLAB V. SWITZERLAND (2001)
By contrast, in Dahlab the Court started to blur the proximity to 
facts. The Court dismissed, as manifestly ill-founded, the application 
of a Swiss primary school teacher, sacked because of her refusal to 
remove the hijab during her working hours. Even though the ECtHR 
admitted that it was very difficult to assess the impact that the wearing 
of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of 
very young children, finally it was persuaded by the need to safeguard 
pupils’ conscience from the “impact that a powerful external symbol 
such as the wearing of a headscarf” could have.74  
6.2.2 FOLLOWING CASE-LAW ON THE ISLAMIC VEIL75 
The abstract tendency can also be identified in the case-law on the 
Islamic veil, relating to individuals performing different tasks, such as 
university professors,76 university students,77 secondary school pupils,78 
or relating to different circumstances, such as sport classes79 or the 
hospital environment80. A note of caution should be sounded when it 
comes to the importance of ensuring an appropriate learning environ-
ment to young pupils and children; nevertheless, it is hard to disagree 
when the evidence adduced is described as too weak81 in respect of the 
74 Dahab v. Switzerland para. 1. The reasoning culminated expressing the difficulty to 
“reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for 
others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination.”
75 See the Special Issue of the Journal Religion, State and Society, “The European Court 
of Human Rights and minority religions”, no. 45 (2017).  
76 Kurtulmus v. Turkey, No. 65500/01 (ECtHR 2006). 
77 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, No. 44774/98 (ECtHR 2005). 
78 Köse and others 93 v. Turkey, No. 26625/02 (ECtHR 2006). 
79 Dogru v. France, No. 27058/05 (ECtHR 2008).
80 Ebrahimian v. France, No. 64846/11 (ECtHR 2015). 
81 Carolyn Evans, “The «Islamic Scarf» in the European Court of Human Rights,” 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 4, no. 7 (2006): 52.
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overall legal reasoning and the parameters used by the Court to deter-
mine the breadth of the margin of appreciation.82
 6.3 FINALLY, THE “LIVING TOGETHER” CONCEPT: AN ABSTRACT EVALUATION 
 OF THE INTEGRATION MODEL 
In the three cases on the “living together” concept as related to the 
full-face veil, what was at stake was not the obligation to dress in a 
neutral way, both in respect of the neutrality principle or safety consid-
erations. Rather, the Court was called to take a position on the way a 
member state integrates minorities.83 
In respect to the latter, many attitudes could be identified at the 
moment as a state’s responses to different religious, cultural and ethni-
cal demands, such as integration, assimilation, accommodation, or 
other forms of shared governance and the discussion is still open for 
debate.84 Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of Strasbourg is consistent in 
its conception of the states as neutral, impartial organizers and promot-
ers of a peaceful coexistence of different religious faiths.85
Despite this, the Court in the “living together” cases considered only 
briefly the risk of consolidating the stereotypes affecting the Muslim 
community and limited the exercise of the conventionality control due 
to the democratic decision-making process lying behind the adoption 
of the ban at the national level.86 Furthermore, it neither engaged in a 
concrete evaluation of that process nor did it question the pragmatic 
82 Effie Fokas, “Directions in Religious Pluralism in Europe: Mobilizations in the 
Shadow of European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Jurisprudence,” Oxford 
Journal of Law and Religion, no. 4 (2015): 58. 
83 The issue was channelled to Strasbourg through what has been described as an identity 
marker: Ayelet Shachar, “Freedom of the Dress. Religion and Women’s Rights in Secular 
States,” Harvard International Law Review 32, no. 2 (2010), 53-59. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that the French penalties for the concealment of the face are a fine or a “citizen-
ship training sessions”. 
84 Nicholas Aroney and Rex Ahdar, “The Topography of Shari’a in the Western Political 
Landscape,” in: Id., Shari’a in the West (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 23-25.
85 Among many, Dogru v. France, para. 62. 
86 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, paras. 52-54. 
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application of the full-face veil ban, ultimately respecting the “choice 
of a society” per se.87
The premises of this reasoning are uncertain: on the one hand, the 
Court does not have the authority to impose uniform social behav-
ioural norms;88 on the other hand, it seems to be an argument which 
is challenged by empirical evidence.89 Grounding the decision on 
questionable factual elements should have required a more exhaustive 
and meticulous motivation in the judgment, whatever the final outcome 
of the decision might have been. To do so, the Court could have 
exploited the opportunity to fully engage and commit itself to a more 
substance-oriented approach, as we will see in the following Section.     
7. SECOND OBSERVATION: PROPORTIONALITY AS EXPRESSLY REQUIRED 
BY THE CONVENTION, THE NEED FOR AN ENGAGED COURT,  
THE “LIVING TOGETHER” CONCEPT READ IN CONJUNCTION  
WITH OTHER CONVENTION PRINCIPLES 
A full engagement of the Court in evaluating concrete circumstances and 
a more substance-oriented judgement involving all the knowledge it gathers 
together could be beneficial for two reasons: establishing a favourable 
setting for a stricter Convention compliance check and, therefore, adopting 
decisions which are potentially less challenging for the Court’s authority.
  7.1 A PROPORTIONALITY TEST IS EXPLICITLY REQUIRED BY ART. 9,  
  PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE CONVENTION
The most suitable tool to facilitate this engagement is the propor-
tionality test which, in the case of Art. 8-11, is incorporated in the 
87 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium paras. 53. Stéphanie Hennette Vauche, “Is French 
laïcité Still Liberal? The Republican Project under Pressure (2004–15),” Human Rights Law 
Review 17 no. 2 (2017): 285-312. 
88 Esther Erlings, “The Government Did Not Refer to It’: SAS v. France and Ordre Public at 
the European Court of Human Rights,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 16 (2015): 10, 21.
89 See Brems, The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law.
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second paragraph of the provision and therefore it is textually required 
by the Convention.90 In fact, assessing whether a specific measure 
promotes effectively the purpose it is supposed to pursue and examin-
ing its necessity in a given situation is a process informed by empiri-
cal evidence91 and depends on the factual circumstances of each case.92 
Moreover, proportionality has been largely recognized as an essential 
tool to adjudicate hard cases such as those at stake: “the more serious a 
limitation of rights is, the more evidence the court will require that the 
factual basis of the limitation has been correctly established.”93
 7.2 THE NEED FOR AN ENGAGED COURT: THE ENHANCEMENT  
 OF AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS  
A judicial attitude strongly based on reality could also be facilitated 
by ensuring more opportunity for the submission of third party repre-
sentations and subsequently taking position on the briefs submitted. 
In the three cases we are commenting on, Amicus Curiae briefs were 
filed mostly by NGOs and Human Rights Centres. These organizations 
tried to widen the Court’s knowledge by adding empirical material 
typical of sociological investigation to the debate.94 surveys, in-depth 
interviews, qualitative analyses and speeches involving women who 
actually wear different types of veil.95 In addition, they described in great 
detail the different legislative processes that took place in Belgium and 
France, explaining their specific features using a collection of expert 
90 Art. 8-11 ECHR. 
91 Niels Petersen, “Avoiding the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: The Role of Social Sciences in 
Constitutional Adjudication,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 11, no. 2 (2013): 302.
92 Olivier De Schutter and Françoise Tulkens, “The European Court of Human Rights as 
a Pragmatic Institution,” in Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, ed. Eva Brems, 169-216. 
Antwerp-Oxford-Portland: Intersentia, 2008. 
93 Julian Rivers, “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review,” The Cambridge 
Law Journal 65, no. 1 (March 2006), 193.
94 Ineke Stoop and Eric Harrison, “Classification of Surveys,” in Handbook of Survey 
Methodology for the Social Sciences, ed. Lior Gideon, 7-21. New York: Springer Science & 
Business Media, 2012. 
95 SAS v. France, at paras. 89-105.
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opinions, the advice of the Council of State and making reference to the 
length and quality of the discussion in the parliamentary Chambers.96  
Their attempt was threefold: firstly, drawing the attention of the 
Court to the evaluation of concrete circumstances at hand. Secondly, 
demonstrating that interaction between individuals is actually possible 
even while wearing a full-face veil. Thirdly, showing the erroneous 
assumption behind the French and Belgian bans insofar as the veil does 
not amount to a withdrawal from social interaction.97 
The Court did not address this empirical material in the decisions and 
referred to it by means of a mere summary of the arguments presented. 
It expressed strong concerns relating to the risk of increasing intoler-
ance and prejudice against Muslims98 but it eventually declared, without 
a robust motivation, that permitting or prohibiting the full-face veil in 
public “constitutes a choice of society,”99 referring to the democratic 
process lying behind the adoption of the laws.100 
Being more sensitive to the third parties’ interventions could have 
been an interesting opportunity to reach an interesting balance and it 
could be beneficial as a response to the direct criticism relating to the 
Court’s authority and legitimacy.101
8. CONCLUSIONS 
As it is quite recent in its jurisprudential elaboration, the contours of 
the “living together” argument remain still uncertain; the need to revisit 
96 Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, “Written Submission by the Human Rights 
Centre of Ghent University in the Case of Dakir v. Belgium,” 4.
97 In addition, they marked some Islamophobic attitudes emerged in the preparatory 
works of the 2010. See Open Society Justice Initiative, “Written Comments of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative in the Case of SAS v. France,” 2014 and Id., “After the Ban: The 
Experiences of 35 Women of the Full-Face Veil in France,” 2013, https://www.opensociety-
foundations.org. 
98 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, para. 52; Dakir v. Belgium, para. 55.
99 SAS v. France, para. 153.  
100 SAS v. France, at paras. 153-155; Dakir v. Belgium, para. 55.
101 Allan R.S. Trevor, “Democracy, Legality, and Proportionality,” in Proportionality 
and the Rule of Law, eds. Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller and Gregoire Webber (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 211. 
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its meaning and implications is strongly encouraged by many scholars, 
especially if future case-law will refer to it as one of the Strasbourg 
Court’s principles on religious freedom, together with pluralism, diver-
sity, tolerance, and reasonable accommodation.102
A stricter application of the proportionality test and a greater consid-
eration of factual circumstances, giving prominence, for example, to 
the third parties’ interventions, could help to prevent vivre ensemble103 
from a potential misuse and ensure that religious freedom will not be 
“beautiful and unattainable.”104
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ARGUMENT ODWOŁUJĄCY SIĘ DO ŻYCIA RAZEM (LIVING TOGETHER) 
W ORZECZNICTWIE EUROPEJSKIEGO TRYBUNAŁU  
PRAW CZŁOWIEKA
Streszczenie
Artykuł analizuje trzy sprawy, w których Europejski Trybunał Praw 
Człowieka użył argumentu odwołującego się do życia razem (living together), 
akceptując go jako uzasadnienie dla zakazu zasłaniania twarzy (burqa i niqab): 
SAS v. France (2014), Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (2017) oraz Dakir 
v. Belgium (2017). Analizie poddane jest samo pojęcie „życia razem” w celu 
wyjaśnienia jego znaczenia i rozwoju we francuskim i belgijskim kontekście. 
Zdaniem Autorki brakuje pogłębionych analiz prawnych, które wystarczająco 
uzasadniałyby stosowanie tego nowego argumentu. Artykuł zamyka postulat 
bardziej skrupulatnego uwzględniania okoliczności faktycznych przy podej-
mowaniu decyzji. Podkreśla się przy tym, że Trybunał powinien w pełniej-
szym zakresie brać pod uwagę całokształt posiadanych informacji, włącza-
jąc w to materiał empiryczny dostarczany przez podmioty interweniujące na 
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zasadzie strony trzeciej. Byłoby to korzystne z dwóch powodów: ułatwiałoby 
zastosowanie testu proporcjonalności oraz chroniłoby Trybunał przed niebez-
piecznym podważaniem jego autorytetu.     
 
 
Słowa kluczowe: Europejski Trybunał Praw Człowieka; burqa i niqab; living 
together; muzułmańskie nakrycie głowy; wolność religijna; proporcjonalność
Key words: European Court of Human Rights; burqa and niqab; living 
together; Muslim veil; religious freedom; proportionality 
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